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Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries
Perform
Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi

ABSTRACT
This paper presents the first empirical anatysis that demonstrates that juries differ from judges
in awarding punitive damages. Our review of punitive damages awards of $100 million or more
identified 63 such awards, of which juries made 95 percent. These jury awards are highly
unpredictable and are not significantly correlated with compensatory damages. Using data on
jury and bench verdicts from the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 1996, we find that juries
are significantly more likely to award punitive damages than are judges and award higher
levels of punitive damages. Jury awards are also less strongly related to compensatory damages.
The differential effect of juries is most pronounced among the largest awards. Juries also tend
to award higher levels of compensatory damages, which in turn boost the punitive damages
award. The findings are robust with respect to controlling for self-selection of jury or bench
trial.

1. INTRODUCTION

Runaway liability costs and highly publicized punitive damages awards
led to a call among policy makers and legal scholars for tort reform
starting in the 1980s. Notwithstanding the enactment of a variety of
restraints on punitive damages awards, large awards still occur. For
example, in 1999, a Los Angeles County jury awarded $4.8 billion in
punitive damages against General Motors to a group of six burn victims
whose Chevrolet Malibu was rear ended, causing it to catch fire (AnViscusi's research is supported by the Harvard Olin Center for Law, Business, and Economics and a grant from
the Exxon Corporation. We thank the referee and editor for valuable comments. Brian
Himot, DeYett Law, Jonathan Patchen, and Adam White provided research assistance.
JONI HERSCH and W. KIP viscusi are at Harvard Law School.
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derson v. GeneralMotors Corporation,120 S. Ct. 424 [Mem.], 528 U.S.
976 [1999]). In 2000, a Dade County (Florida) jury awarded $145 billion
in punitive damages in a class action case involving the tobacco industry
(Engle v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 CA 22 [Fl. Cir.
Ct., 11th Jud. Dist., Dade Cty., November 6, 2000]).
Some reform advocates have hypothesized that punitive damages
awards would be lower and more predictable if authority over these
awards were transferred from jurors to judges. This view stems from
the observation that very large punitive damages awards are typically
reduced on appeal. Indeed, defenders of punitive damages often note
that the appeals process greatly diminishes the influence of awards that
may be regarded as outliers. Additional support derives from experimental research that shows that judges award lower levels of punitive
damages than jurors when confronting the same case scenario.'
There is no firm empirical evidence in support of the widespread
perception that juries are largely responsible for the major punitive damages awards. This paper provides empirical evidence on the comparative
roles of judges and juries in awarding punitive damages by taking two
approaches. First, we systematically searched for punitive damages
awards of at least $100 million. We identified 63 such awards over the
period January 1985-June 2003. Only three of these blockbuster awards
were set by a judge rather than by a jury. This tendency of large punitive
awards to be the result of jury decisions is consistent with the experimental evidence as well as popular perceptions. Analysis of these very
large awards indicates that they bear no statistical relation to the compensatory awards.
We follow this analysis of extremely large awards with empirical
evidence from the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 1996. The Civil
Justice Survey of State Courts provides information on over 9,000 cases
tried to a verdict in 1996 in 45 state courts. This data set provides a
representative sample of trial outcomes rather than a selection of trials
that result in extreme awards. We find that, controlling for compensatory
damages, case mix, and other characteristics, juries are more likely to
make punitive awards and make larger awards. These findings are robust
with respect to alternative empirical specifications and estimating procedures, including recognition of self-selection of trial forum. We also
find that juries award greater compensatory damages than do judges for
1. For an overview, see Sunstein et al. (2002). Studies that provide a comparison of
judges and juries are Viscusi (1999, 2001) and Hastie and Viscusi (1998).
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any given case type. These higher compensatory damages awards in turn
boost punitive damages awards.
Using the same data set, Eisenberg et al. (2002) found that juries and
judges do not differ significantly in their awards of punitive damages or
in the predictability of their punitive awards. We examine the reasons
why our findings strongly contradict those in Eisenberg et al. Our analysis identifies two pivotal differences. First, their study undermined the
potential influence of the jury effect by including two jury-related variables in their analysis, thus inducing multicollinearity. Second, differences across counties in judge and jury performance were ignored in
their analysis but are significant influences that must be taken into account. All other variations between the two studies lead to results that
are consistent with our general finding that juries have a greater tendency
to award punitive damages than do judges.

2. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONCERNS

In this section, we provide an overview of the law and economics of
optimal punitive damages and discuss selection effects with respect to
trial forum. Starting with optimal punitive damages, law and economics
theory implies that for purposes of optimal deterrence, the total award
should equal the economic value of the harm divided by the probability
of being found liable.2 If the compensatory damages amount equals the
economic harm, then punitive damages should vary linearly with the
value of compensatory damages for any given probability of being found
liable. To see this relation, denote punitive damages by PD, compensatory damages by CD, and the probability of being found liable by s.
Then the award leading to optimal deterrence is given by
CD
PD + CD = -.

(1)

S

This equation can be rewritten as 3
PD

s)CD

(2)

2. A recent review of the underpinnings for punitive damages is Polinsky and Shavell
(1998). The intellectual origins of this approach can be traced back to Bentham (1962)
and Becker (1968).
3. This equation is equivalent to that in footnote S1 of Polinsky and Shavell (1998)
setting CD equal to the value of the harm.
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Whether a particular ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages is appropriate depends on the probability of being found liable. But
irrespective of the value of this probability, there should be a linear
relation between compensatory damages and punitive damages for any
given value of s. The relation between punitive damages and compensatory damages does, however, vary with s, which differs across cases.
Consequently, it is instructive to take logs of equation (2) and express
the relation as
InPD = In(1S) + In CD.

(3)

Thus, there is a linear relation between the log of punitive damages and
the log of compensatory damages across cases with different probabilities
of being found liable. We examine this linkage as an index of the degree
to which punitive damages satisfy law and economics principles.
Selection arises from the choice of trial forum and the effect of trial
forum on the probability of trial. Joni Hersch (2003) finds that plaintiffs
demanding larger damages awards are more likely to demand a jury
trial and that cases in which a jury trial is demanded are more likely to
settle rather than continue to trial.4 If, say, plaintiffs who expect to get
a large punitive damages award also believe that they will get an even
larger award if heard by a jury than by a judge, these plaintiffs may
self-select into a jury trial. If these cases are likewise more likely to settle,
the effect of jury trial among cases tried to verdict may be understated.
The Civil Justice Survey of State Courts provides data only on cases
tried to verdict, so we are not able to correct for selection effects that
arise from differential probability of trial by trial forum. Using available
data, we control for potential selection effects that remain after the
settlement stage by estimating a first-stage regression of the choice of
trial type followed by the estimate of our punitive damages equations
controlling for the selectivity correction term.

3. BLOCKBUSTER AWARDS

To examine whether juries and judges differ in their tendency to make
extremely large punitive damages awards, we undertook a detailed
4. The standard case selection model focuses on the settlement decision abstracting
from the choice of trial forum. If the decision maker has a particular bias, parties will take
these influences into account at the settlement stage. See Priest and Klein (1984).
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search to identify all cases in which there were punitive damages of at
least $100 million. The search included Lexis Combined Jury Verdicts
and Settlements (which includes bench trials as well as jury trials), several
Westlaw databases, the Google search engine, major newspapers, and
articles in American Lawyer. We identified 63 such awards for the period
from January 1985 to June 2003. Although the resulting list may not
be complete, it is an extensive and systematically compiled list of the
largest punitive damages awards in U.S. court cases.
Our analysis of these blockbuster awards supplements the analysis
of the 1996 state courts trials data that begins in the next section. Punitive awards in excess of $100 million are quite rare. Despite their
rarity, it is the large awards that figure prominently in discussions of
civil justice reform. But given their rarity, any statistically based sample
of trials, such as the state courts data, is unlikely to include many cases
with large punitive damages awards.
Table 1 summarizes these punitive damages awards. The table is divided into two groups on the basis of whether the initial trial outcome
resulted in a punitive damages award by a judge or by a jury. Within
each category, cases are listed in order of increasing size of the punitive
damages amount.' Notice that judges made only three of these large
awards. Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Co. was actually a jury
trial in which the jury set compensatory damages of $456 million for
the breach-of-contract count. However, the judge set damages for the
fraud count, setting the punitive damages award at $600 million and
the compensatory damages award at $130 million.
Juries set the remaining 60 punitive awards of at least $100 million,
of which 11 were for at least a billion dollars. The largest punitive
damages award is $145 billion awarded for the Florida tobacco class
action, Engle v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. An individual plaintiff cigarette case, Bullock v. Philip Morris, generated the second largest punitive damages award of $28 billion. The environmental contamination
suit for the Exxon Valdez oil spill led to $5 billion in punitive damages,
while the GM products liability burn case had a $4.8 billion award.
Four awards were in the $3 billion range: a royalty payments fraud case
against Exxon, a New Orleans tank car leakage products liability case,
a products liability case against Texaco, and a cigarette products liability
5. Defendants often do not pay the punitive damages amounts listed in Table 1. Many
awards have been overturned or reduced on appeal, and others have settled privately or
are still under appeal.
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case against Philip Morris. A case involving dilution of prescription drugs
for a cancer patient led to a $2 billion award. At the $1 billion level
were an environmental contamination suit against Alpha Technical Services,
Inc., and a products liability case against Johnson Kart Manufacturing.
That juries account for 95 percent of these blockbuster awards is a
notable statistic. Jury trials account for about 68 percent of all civil cases
tried to verdict in state courts and federal district courts.6 The difference
between the observed 95 percent share of blockbuster awards by juries
and the expected share of 68 percent jury awards is statistically significant and indicates that juries awarded a disproportionate share of the
blockbuster awards. 7
The year of the initial trial decision appears in the second column of
Table 1. Although the era of $100 million-plus awards extends from
January 1985 to June 2003, during the first half of this period there
were only 11 such awards, while during the latter half there were 52
awards. The sum of punitive awards since 2000 accounts for 88 percent
of the total dollar value of all 63 awards.
A widely cited barometer of whether a punitive damages award is
out of line is the ratio of the punitive damages award to the compensatory award. This ratio has been a matter of concern in U.S. Supreme
Court decisions, but only in 2003 did the Court offer guidance on what
maximum ratio would usually be considered acceptable. 8 As Table 1
demonstrates, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages
varies considerably. Punitive damages are not always larger than compensatory damages. Sometimes, however, the ratio is extremely high. For

6. See U.S. Department of Justice (1999, p. 1), which reports that 10,616 of 15,638
cases disposed of by trial in 1996 in the 75 most populous counties were jury trials. Federal
statistics on civil cases in which there was a court action during or after trial in U.S. district
courts for the year ending June 30, 2001, indicate that there were 3,747 jury trials out of
a total of 5,593 trials, or a jury share of .67. See http://www.uscourts.gov/judiciary200l/
tables/c04jun0I.pdf, table C-4.
7. The z-value is 4.6, which indicates the probability that the observed disparity occurred by chance is miniscule. There may, of course, be differences in case mix, as we
address below using the state court data. Furthermore, we cannot rule out that these
extremely large awards are made predominantly by juries precisely because the potential
of a large jury award causes such cases to be sorted into a jury trial.
8. In State Farm v. Campbell, the Supreme Court stated, "[I]n practice, few awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant
degree, will satisfy due process. . . . When compensatory damages are substantial, then
a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit
of the due process guarantee" (123 S. Ct. 1513 [2003]).
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example, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages in
Bullock v. Philip Morris is 43,077.
Whether punitive damages are correlated with compensatory damages is a recurring question in the literature.9 We estimate the relation
between punitive damages and compensatory damages for the 60 jury
awards listed in Table 1 using levels as well as logarithms of damages
values. Taking the logarithm of both punitive and compensatory damages greatly compresses the range of values, particularly for large awards.
Simple regression of these 60 punitive damages amounts against compensatory damages values indicates that these amounts have no statistically significant relation, whether the analysis is in terms of levels or
logs of these damages awards. In the levels regression, the coefficient
and standard error on compensatory damages are -. 20 (2.57), with an
adjusted R 2 of -. 02. The corresponding values in the logs regression are
.12 (.10), with an adjusted R 2 of .01. While punitive awards and compensatory awards are generally awarded to the same set of plaintiffs, in
Engle v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., compensatory damages were set
for the class representatives, but punitive damages were set with respect
to the entire class of smokers. Excluding Engle, the coefficient and standard error in the levels equation are .25 (.51), with an adjusted R2 of
-. 01, and in the logs equation are .14 (.08), with an adjusted R2 of .03.
For the blockbuster award sample, the value of the compensatory award
is not a significant predictor of the value of punitive damages.

4.

DESCRIPTION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS,

1996 DATA

SET

The Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 1996 is a sample of tort, contract, and real property rights cases that were disposed of by trial in
calendar year 1996 (U.S. Department of Justice 2001).1" The 1996 survey
used the same sampling frame as a similar 1992 survey of jury trial cases
but expanded the study to include both bench and jury trials. The in9. For assessments on the predictability of punitive damages or the lack thereof, see
Eisenberg et al. (1997) and Polinsky (1997). Eisenberg et al. (1997) take a point of view
outside the mainstream and claim that punitive damages are highly predictable and, in
particular, that punitive damages can be reliably predicted by compensatory damages.
10. The data were collected by the National Center for State Courts under a grant
from the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Information on the data
collection procedure and variable availability is provided in the computer file documentation.

PUNITIVE

DAMAGES

/

11

formation reported for each trial includes type of trial (jury, judge, or
other)," type of case (motor vehicle accident, fraud, employment discrimination, and so forth), type of litigant (individual, hospital, business,
and so forth), the amount of compensatory and punitive damages if
awarded, and county.
The sampling procedure used by the Civil Justice Survey of State
Courts was a two-stage stratified sample. In the first stage, 45 counties
were selected from the 75 most populous counties, with selection rates
varying by the number of civil cases in that county in 1990. If there
were fewer than approximately 300 bench or 300 jury trials in the
county, all trials meeting the survey criteria were included in the study.
In 36 counties, all trials were included in the data set. When there were
more than 300 trials of either kind, a random sample of 275 cases of
that trial type was selected. Any remaining cases of medical malpractice,
professional malpractice, or products liability that were not in the initial
random sample were also included in the sample. The number of trials
varied considerably among the counties. At the low end, Honolulu, Hawaii, contributed only 25 jury trials and 21 bench trials to the sample,
while Allegheny, Pennsylvania, contributed 201 jury trials and 202 bench
trials. There were 10 or fewer bench trials in six of the counties.
The 1996 survey reports information on 9,025 trials in 45 state trial
courts. Not all of the 9,025 cases are used in our analyses, mainly because
of missing data. One case we exclude from our analyses is a jury-awarded
compensatory damages award of over $40 billion, with no punitive
damages, against Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, which was reversed by
the Hawaii Supreme Court (see U.S. Department of Justice 1999, p. 8).
Of the remaining 9,024 trials, 227 were neither jury nor bench verdicts,
216 were missing data on the compensatory damages award, 2 and 85
had missing information on either case type or litigant pair. Thus, the
full sample for the analyses is composed of 8,496 observations. Of these
8,496 observations, the plaintiff prevailed in 4,336 trials.' 3
Figure 1 summarizes the overall structure of the trials in the sample.
Roughly three-fourths of the sample consists of jury trials, and one11. These included directed verdicts, judgments notwithstanding the verdict, and jury
trials for defaulted defendants.
12. There are no cases in which compensatory damages are missing but punitive damages are reported, so there is no additional loss of observations due to missing data on the
value of punitive damages.
13. There are 14 cases in the sample in which the defendant received a punitive damages
award. These cases are not analyzed in this paper.
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Table 2. Characteristics of Damages Awards
Jury
Number of trials
Number with PD > 0
Percent with PD > 0
PD characteristics if > 0:

Mean ($)
Standard deviation
Median
Mean of log(PD)
CD characteristics:

Mean ($)
Standard deviation
Median
Mean of log(CD)
Ratio of PD to CD if both > 0:
Mean
Standard deviation
Median
Percent with PD:
$1-$9,999
$10,000-$99,999
$100,000-$299,999
$300,000-$999,999
$1 million-$138 million

Bench

Combined

2,972
119
4.00

1,364
54
3.96

4,336
173
3.99

1,816,031
12,974,300
50,000
10.69

557,292
3,425,466
33,000
10.16

1,423,130
10,928,939
40,000
10.53

423,528
1,868,729
45,000
10.80

152,344
982,626
25,000
10.01

338,220
1,647,057
36,159
10.55
3.56
20.61
.51

4.60
24.70
.49
22.69
36.97
14.29
18.49
7.56

22.22
53.70
18.52
1.85
3.70

22.54
42.20
15.61
13.29
6.36

Note. The sample is composed of jury and bench trials in which the plaintiff won. PD =
punitive damages; CD = compensatory damages.

fourth are bench trials. The probability of plaintiff success is .62 for
bench trials and .47 for jury trials. These plaintiff success rates do not
necessarily imply that judges are more plaintiff oriented than are juries.
As discussed earlier, the mix of cases heard in each venue will depend
both on the routing of cases to judges and juries as well as on which
cases are settled and which are not. While judges and juries each have
a .04 probability of awarding punitive damages, on average, jury awards
are higher than bench awards. The mean punitive damages award is
$1,816,031 for juries and $557,292 for judges.

5. PUNITIVE AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AWARDS

Table 2 presents more detailed information on damages awards for the
sample of 4,336 trials in which the plaintiff won. Juries decided 68.5
percent of these trials, with judges deciding the remaining 31.5 percent.
Compensatory damages were awarded in almost all trials in which the
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plaintiff prevailed (although there are five exceptions in which compensatory damages were zero). Punitive damages were awarded in 173 of
the 4,336 trials in which the plaintiff won. Of these 173 trials, 119 were
jury trials and the remaining 54 were bench trials.
As Table 2 reports, the mean punitive damages award level for juries
is 3.3 times that for judges, while the median award level for juries is
1.5 times that for judges. The ratio of the mean of the log values is
1.05." The larger disparity in mean values between jury and bench trials
compared with the median and with the log values suggests that jury
trials result in more punitive damages awards with high values.
Over the full sample of cases in which the plaintiff won, the compensatory damages awards show a pattern similar to that of punitive
awards, with the mean compensatory award made by juries being 2.8
times the mean level for judges, the median jury award 1.8 times that
for judges, and the ratio of the mean of the log values equal to 1.08.
The mean of the ratio of punitive to compensatory awards in cases
in which both types of awards were made is 4.6 for juries and 1.25 for
judges. But the median of this ratio is actually lower for juries. Comparing the means and median by type of trial indicates that juries award
large punitive damages relative to compensatory damages more frequently than do judges. The standard deviation of the ratio of punitive
to compensatory damages for juries is 8.5 times the standard deviation
for judges, which indicates greater variability.
Much of the concern with respect to punitive damages pertains to
the large-award outliers that are in the hundreds of millions or even in
the billions of dollars. The distribution of awards reported at the bottom
of Table 2 and illustrated in Figure 2 demonstrates that there are fairly
few dramatic awards in this sample. Most of the punitive damages
awards were small. Twenty-three percent of the awards were for less
than $10,000, with judges and juries almost equally likely to make
awards of this size. When legal reformers express alarm regarding punitive damages, these are not the awards that have generated concern.
Consider the upper end of the awards spectrum. Of the cases in which
the plaintiffs received punitive damages awards ranging from $300,000
to $999,999, 18 percent of the jury cases awarded punitive damages in
this range, while only 2 percent of the bench punitive damages awards
were at this level. Similarly, 8 percent of punitive damages awards set
14. Here and throughout the paper we add $1 to damages amounts before calculating
the logarithm.
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Figure 2. Distribution of jury and judge punitive damages awards

by juries were for at least $1 million, compared with 4 percent for judges.
The largest punitive damages award in the state court sample is a jury verdict
for $138 million. Thus, at the high end of awards, which are the main
matter of concern, jury trials play a dominant role.
In our analysis of blockbuster awards, we estimated a simple regression of the relation between punitive and compensatory damages
and found that jury punitive awards had no significant relation to compensatory awards. With only three bench awards in the blockbuster
sample, we were not able to estimate the corresponding relation for
judges' awards. The state courts data do allow us to estimate this relation
for both jury trials and bench trials. Panel A of Table 3 presents regression results in levels, and panel B presents regression results in logs.
As with the blockbuster sample, the only explanatory variable is the
compensatory damages award. We find that compensatory awards are
significantly related to punitive awards for both jury and bench trials.
However, the explanatory power of the equations differs considerably
between the two types of trials. The adjusted R2 in panel A is .68 for
judges but only .16 for juries, as differences in the compensatory award
explain the roughly fourfold variation in punitive damages for judges
compared with juries.
The log results in panel B compress much of the variation in damages
levels. Punitive damages awards are again more predictable for bench
trials than for jury trials, where the fraction of the log value of punitive
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Table 3. Simple Regression Results for Punitive Damages Awards

Jury
A. Punitive damages:'
Compensatory damages
Constant
Adjusted R2
B. Log(punitive damages):a
Log(compensatory damages)
Constant
Adjusted R 2

Bench

3.265**
.676**
(.674)
(.063)
-137,796
-60,729
(1,162,171) (269,981)
.16
.68
.666**
(.094)
3.192**
(1.078)
.30

.688**
(.082)
2.879*
(.886)
.57

Note. The sample is composed of jury (N = 119) and bench (N =
54) trials in which the plaintiff won and punitive damages were
awarded. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Dependent variable.
* * The coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level,
two-sided tests.

damages explained by the regression is .57 for judges and .30 for juries.
The practical consequence of using logarithms is to greatly compress the
apparent variability of awards. The logarithm of punitive damages for
the median award amount of $50,000 by juries is 10.8. Doubling the
absolute value of the median award level increases it to $100,000. However, a doubling of the logarithm of the median punitive damages amount
corresponds to an increase in the level of punitive damages to $2.4
billion. Analyzing the variability of awards when considering patterns
of log values of punitive damages consequently may mask much of the
variability of the level of punitive damages.
The log estimates in panel B of Table 3 provide a test of whether
judges and juries perform in accordance with the optimal penalty model
in Section 2. In each case, the slope coefficients are significantly less than
the value of 1.0 that is predicted by equation (3). i s Factors other than
compensatory damages are influential.
While it is true that punitive damages award outliers contribute to
greater unpredictability of jury awards, the existence of outliers that
15. If the coefficient on the log of compensatory damages had equaled 1.0, then the
intercept term could be interpreted as providing an estimate of In [(1 - s)/sl, where s is the
probability of being found liable. The estimated intercepts imply a value for s of .04 for
the jury cases and .05 for the bench trials. We thank the referee for calling these points to
our attention.
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cannot be predicted is precisely the matter of concern in debates over
reform efforts to address the unpredictability of punitive damages. These
findings indicate that unpredictable punitive damages for the sample of
blockbuster jury awards are consistent with the pattern of jury behavior
in a broader sample of cases.

6.

EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

So far our analysis has examined the predictability of punitive awards
from compensatory awards, conditional on a punitive award being
made. We found that punitive awards are less reliably predicted from
compensatory awards for awards made by juries than by judges. We
now examine whether juries and judges differ in their propensity to make
punitive awards and in the magnitude of these awards, controlling for
differences in case mix and other characteristics. As before, we assume
that punitive damages are awarded sequentially after compensatory
damages rather than jointly. In Section 9, we examine whether juries
and judges differ in their compensatory awards.
The Supreme Court has identified several factors that can be used to
guide the level of punitive damages awards. These factors include the
reprehensibility of defendant conduct, the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages awards, the defendant's financial status, and the legal
environment, which includes civil and criminal penalties for similar conduct. In our analysis, we use proxies for these factors that are based on
available data. The compensatory damages award is available within
the data set. We proxy defendant conduct by case type. Intentional acts
should have a greater likelihood of a punitive damages award than negligent acts. We use litigant pairs as a proxy for the defendant's financial
status. Corporations typically have greater financial resources than do
individuals. We control for county as a proxy for the legal environment.
States differ in liability criteria and in damages rules, and counties differ
in the demographic composition of juries and litigants.
Table 4 presents summary statistics for damages awards, litigant
pairs, case types, and county. The columns present statistics for jury
trials and bench trials for two groups: cases that the plaintiff won and
cases that the plaintiff won and for which the plaintiff received a punitive
damages award. For all cases in which the plaintiff won, the average
compensatory damages award is $423,528 for jury trials and $152,344
for bench trials. Judges awarded higher compensatory awards than did

t

rl r1

00O\0

vN

O

0

.0

C>\or
0

N

~N

-

Nn Ne
,r

N

~
\

0c

(o-

10

0-

o
r'

6

rq

00
40

V'r

-L r
r
*00

~-

C

0

C0

0

CO
72

e

N-~ 0 N-

0

o

0N-'

E0

0
CF* 0

0CC
E

0

.0

E
-O

C

-c

m

a

0

-0
00

Ca

-a a0
.,
7--

0
CO

1

o o7
>

-

>

CO

a-6

o

u
C.

O
-

6n!o

C'~ (4-

00c all

r4I

- al-

CDc

1

\D\0

=

\0

=

1

~~ ~ ~ ~

N l

ao C,4-

nll l

"

'

\l

N

r'J
N

C-14
C, Nl
l
\

\00 n

a\mt1
V:r C

1

r4 N NN

10"a
C
tN

C
n

-

aN

U

0
0

Etc
S

o
S0~

~0
0
U

.0 -

c

U

r~0

0 o
g- N

-U

z

20 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 33 (1)

/ JANUARY 2004

juries in cases in which punitive damages were awarded, with mean
values of $598,497 in jury trials and $914,111 in bench trials.
The survey reports very narrowly defined litigant types for both plaintiffs and defendants, allowing 12 options for each plaintiff and defendant
type for up to eight plaintiffs and eight defendants. Most pairs of litigant
types have few observations, so we group cases into four major categories
of individual versus individual; individual versus hospital, corporation,
or government; individual and nonindividual versus hospital, corporation, government, or individual; and nonindividual versus hospital, corporation, government, or individual. As Table 4 indicates for the sample
of cases in which the plaintiff won, 38 percent of cases heard by a jury
involved individual plaintiffs suing other individuals and 52 percent involved individuals suing hospitals, corporations, or government. In contrast, only 26 percent of bench trials involve individuals suing individuals, and 28 percent involve individuals suing hospitals, corporations,
or government. While 7 percent of jury cases dealt with lawsuits on
behalf of nonindividuals, 41 percent of judges' cases involved disputes
with nonindividual plaintiffs. Few cases had both individual and nonindividuals as plaintiffs and defendants for either bench or jury trials.
The survey allows reporting of 22 case type codes, which are grouped
under the broader categories of tort, contract and commercial, and real
property. As with litigant pairs, several of the codes have few observations, so we group cases into 12 broader categories. These groupings,
reported in Table 4, include seven tort categories: motor vehicle accident;
premises liability; asbestos, breast implant, or other products liability;
intentional act; medical or professional malpractice; slander, libel, or
defamation; and other negligent act. There are four contract and commercial case categories: fraud; seller and buyer plaintiff; employment
discrimination or other employment dispute; and mortgage foreclosure,
rental/lease agreement, intentional/tortious interference, or other contract dispute. The final grouping is the much smaller category of real
property cases that includes eminent domain/condemnation, title or
boundary dispute, and other real property issue.
As Table 4 demonstrates, among trials in which the plaintiff wins,
the types of cases faced by juries and judges are distributed in a manner
consistent with the types of litigants. To generalize, juries see a far larger
share of tort cases, in which the plaintiff is usually an individual, and
judges see a far larger share of contract and real property cases, which
more often involve businesses. Juries are more likely to encounter cases
involving motor vehicle accidents, premises liability, products liability,
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and medical malpractice cases. Almost half of all jury trials in which
the plaintiff won are motor vehicle accident cases, compared with only
10 percent for judges. In contrast, bench trials play a dominant role for
many of the financial transaction cases, such as those in which the buyer
or seller is a plaintiff or there is a mortgage foreclosure. Nearly half of
the bench trials in which the plaintiff won are cases involving either a
buyer or seller plaintiff, compared with 8 percent for juries.
In order to control for possible county-specific effects, we define a
set of indicator variables. Most of the 45 counties included in the data
set had few cases in which there was a punitive damages award. Indeed,
eight counties had no trials awarding punitive damages. In the main
results presented in the tables, we defined indicator variables for each
county that contributed at least two each of jury and bench trials to the
sample with positive punitive damages. We thereby define 10 such indicator variables. The 10 counties account for 42.9 percent of the trials
in which juries awarded punitive damages and 68.5 of the trials in which
judges awarded punitive damages. We also estimate equations with indicator
variables for all counties. As we discuss later, the results are sensitive to
controlling for Harris County but are not substantially affected otherwise
by the number of county indicator variables in the specification.

7. THE DETERMINANTS

OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS

It is evident from Table 4 that judges and juries see different types of
cases. Our empirical analysis controls for many of these case characteristics and other factors that influence the type of trial. We initially
treat the trial forum as exogenous to the punitive awards decision. We
then test for potential self-selection effects in which the parties' choice
of trial forum may bias the jury effect. Our analysis indicates that any
bias that may arise from assuming the trial forum is exogenous is at
most minor and gives credence to the assumption that trial forum is
exogenous within the sample analyzed here. For that reason, we focus
in this paper on the results without the selection correction.
Table 5 reports the results of estimating the determinants of punitive
damages under two approaches. First, we present estimates of the magnitude of punitive awards. 6 Because of the large number of zero values
16. A recent analysis of punitive damages awards is Karpoff and Lott (1999), which
uses a sample of cases compiled by searching for "punitive" in the LexisNexis library,
restricted to publicly traded corporate defendants. The study does not distinguish between
jury and judge trials.
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for punitive damages, we use tobit regression. Tobit regression simultaneously takes into account the likelihood of a nonzero punitive damages award and the magnitude of the award if positive. The dependent
variable takes on the value of the punitive award if the award is positive
and zero otherwise, and the estimating procedure adjusts for the probability of a zero award in calculating the regression coefficients. Second,
we use probit regression to present estimates of whether there is a difference between juries and judges in the probability of making an award.
The dependent variable is equal to one if a punitive award is made and
is zero otherwise.
As Table 2 and Figure 2 made clear, the distributions of punitive
awards and compensatory awards are highly skewed. Both tobit and
probit regressions are highly sensitive to the assumption of normality.
Tests on the levels of punitive and compensatory damages lead to a
rejection of the assumption of normality. Tests on the logs of these
damages values demonstrate that one cannot reject the assumption of
normality of punitive damages in the tobit regression.17 The results presented in the following tables use the logs of the damages awards, as in
equation (3) of Section 2.
Table 5 reports both the original tobit or probit coefficients, associated standard errors, and estimates of the marginal effect of a 1-unit
change in each of the explanatory variables. Both equations control for
the same set of variables. Each equation includes an indicator variable
equal to one for a jury trial, the log of compensatory damages, and
indicator variables for three types of litigant pairs, 11 case types, and
10 counties. The omitted litigant pair category is nonindividual versus
hospital, corporation, government, or individual. We expect cases with
individual plaintiffs to fare better in terms of punitive awards relative
to the omitted category, particularly when the defendant is not also an
individual. The omitted case type category is motor vehicle accident.
Because motor vehicle tort cases generally are routine insurance cases,
we expect other case types to be associated with higher punitive awards,
especially those involving intentional acts. 18
17. A conditional moment test of the null hypothesis of normal errors yields a p-value

of .09.
18. In alternative specifications, we controlled for whether the trial occurred in a state

that had a punitive damages cap in place. The damages cap variable was never statistically
significant and is consequently not included. We also estimated. equations controlling for
the year in which the case was filed. The year indicators were never statistically significant,
either individually or jointly, and are likewise not included in the results reported here.
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Before discussing the magnitude of the effects, it is useful to give an
overview of the findings. Both equations demonstrate a positive effect
of a jury trial on punitive awards, statistically significant at the 95 percent level in the tobit estimates and at the 99 percent level in the probit
estimates. Cases with high compensatory awards are associated with
greater punitive awards. Among the litigant pairs, cases with individual
plaintiffs fare better relative to the omitted group of cases with nonindividual plaintiffs. Relative to motor vehicle cases, all case types except
medical and professional malpractice and the catchall category of "other
negligent acts" are associated with higher punitive damages awards.
To interpret the magnitude of the coefficients, it is useful to calculate
the marginal effect of the variables evaluated at the mean values of the
independent variables. For the tobit estimates, we report the marginal
effects on log punitive awards for the entire sample including those in
which a punitive award was not made. The marginal effect of a jury
trial is .09, representing 21 percent of the mean value of the log of the
punitive damages variable for the full sample, which is .42. The probit
estimates indicate that jury trials have a .011 greater probability of a
punitive award. Since the overall probability of a punitive award is .04,
the magnitude of the jury effect on the probability of an award is 28
percent.
The expectation that intentional acts will have a greater impact on
punitive damages is supported by the results. For example, the probit
estimates indicate that relative to the omitted category of motor vehicle
cases, the marginal effects of a punitive award being made are .33 for
intentional acts, .26 for employment discrimination or other employment
disputes, .25 for fraud, .24 for real property cases, and .24 for slander,
libel, or defamation.
As we discussed in Section 2, Hersch (2003) shows that choice of
trial forum influences the probability of trial, with cases demanding jury
trial being more likely to settle. However, in addition to the effect of
trial forum on settlement, there may be an additional effect of trial forum
on punitive damages owing to selection of trial forum. To examine
whether the estimated effects of a jury trial reported in Table 5 are biased
because of sorting into trial type on the basis of expected outcomes, we
estimate a treatment effects model to control for self-selection of type
of trial (see, for example, Greene 2003, pp. 787-89). This procedure is
an extension of the standard Heckman selection model. In the basic
Heckman model, the dependent variable is observed only for the selfselected subsample. In the current situation, there is selection in the
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choice of forum, but the trial outcome is observed for both bench trials
and jury trials. As in the standard Heckman selection model, the treatment effects procedure includes in the punitive damages equation a selection correction term (inverse Mills ratio) calculated from a probit for
choice of forum.
We expect the type of trial selected to be a function of the number
and characteristics of litigants who are eligible to choose the trial type,
the expected costs of each forum, and the expected difference in damages
amounts by type of trial. The data set includes information on the number of plaintiffs, defendants, pro se plaintiffs, and pro se defendants.
More litigants should increase the likelihood that at least one party
requests a jury trial. Pro se participants should prefer bench trials to
jury trials. We proxy the expected costs of each forum by the predicted
time from filing to verdict. Using the full data set, we estimated predicted
time to verdict for bench trials and for jury trials as a function of detailed
case type (22 case types), county (45 counties), and year of filing. Other
variables, such as the damages request and information on the parties'
expectations, were not available in the data set.
The results of the first-stage regression predicting trial type indicated
that the choice of jury trial is inversely related to the number of pro se
plaintiffs and the number of pro se defendants, where these effects are
significant at the 99 percent level. The coefficients for predicted time to
verdict for bench trials and the total number of defendants were positive
and marginally significant, with p-values of .16 and .13, respectively.
The coefficients for predicted time to jury trial and the total number of
plaintiffs were not significant at any reasonable level.
Using the sample of cases in which the plaintiff won, we estimated
two second-stage punitive damages equations. In one equation, the dependent variable is the log of punitive awards. The other equation is a
linear probability regression of whether a punitive award was made.' 9
In both equations, the jury coefficients remained positive, with p-values
of .09.20 Consistent with our earlier discussion of selection effects, we
find evidence that the effect of jury trial on punitive damages is understated. The magnitudes of the jury coefficients are higher in the equations
that correct for selection than in their non-selection-corrected counter19. We estimated these equations using the "treatreg" procedure in Stata 7.0.
20. In the log-punitive-awards equation, the coefficient on the jury variable is .354,
with a standard error of .209. In the linear probability equation, the coefficient on the jury

variable is .033, with a standard error of .019.
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Table 6. Quantile Regression Results for Punitive Damages Awards
Explanatory Variables
Jury trial
Log(compensatory damages)
Constant

.10
-. 706
(.527)
.912**
(.105)
-. 789
(1.417)

.25
-. 249
(.223)
.830*
(.081)
.587
(.916)

.50

.75

-. 019
(.230)
.866*
(.107)
.945
(1.202)

.481
(.357)
.642*
(.190)
4.211
(2.155)

.90
.924*
(.443)
.446"
(.220)
6.957*
(2.462)

Note. The sample is composed of jury and bench trials in which plaintiff won and punitive
damages were awarded (173 observations). The dependent variable is log(punitive damages). Column headings indicate the quantile. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
The coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level, two-sided tests.
The coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, two-sided tests.

parts." Furthermore, the test of the null hypothesis that the forum choice
equation and the punitive damages equation are independent could not
be rejected in either specification.22 This independence therefore implies
that, at least for this sample of cases, selection does not bias the estimated
effect of a jury trial on punitive damages awards.

3

8. QUANTILE REGRESSION ESTIMATES

A principal implication of the compilation of large-award cases in Table
1 was that for the very big punitive damages awards of at least $100
million, juries play a dominant role. While there is only one award of
this magnitude in the 1996 state court sample, we now use the state
court data to examine whether the role of juries with respect to punitive
damages awards is particularly great in large-award cases. As the descriptive statistics in Table 2 suggest, any disparities between juries and
judges appear more likely to arise at the high punitive damages level.

21. In the log-punitive-awards equation that does not allow for selection, the coefficient
on the jury variable is .241, with a standard error of .086. In the linear probability equation
that does not allow for selection, the coefficient on the jury variable is .022, with a standard
error of .008.
22. The p-value for the test of independence is .58 for the log-punitive-damages equation and .55 for the linear probability equation.
23. Helland and Tabarrok (2000) control for selection of trial type, also among cases
tried to verdict, and find that total damages in personal injury cases are higher when
awarded by a jury than by a judge, although most of the difference in average awards
between jury and judge trials is due to differences in case mix.
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To explore this variation in awards, Table 6 presents quantile regressions
for five different percentiles. 24
Because quantile regressions focus on determinants of damages for
particular quantiles, taking into account the likelihood of being in the
quantile, there are severe limits to the number of variables that can be
included in the specification when using a sample of the size available
in this data set. We focus on equations including only a constant term,
the log of compensatory damages, and whether there is a jury trial.
The quantile regressions make it possible to analyze how the coefficients of these variables differ across the distribution of punitive damages. Interestingly, from the 10th percentile through the 75th percentile
of these awards, the influence of jury trials on the level of punitive
damages is not statistically significant. However, at the 90th percentile
there is a positive and statistically significant effect of jury trial on the
level of punitive damages awards. The jury effect is most consequential
among the large awards. The incremental jury effect is consequently not
uniform across the entire spectrum of awards but instead is concentrated
among large awards.
It is unclear how the relation between compensatory and punitive
awards should differ across the quantiles. The blockbuster cases indicated no relation between compensatory and punitive awards, although
over the broader spectrum of cases in the state court data we find a
significant relation. Our quantile results indicate a weaker relation between compensatory and punitive awards at higher award levels, as the
coefficients at the 90th percentile and the 75th percentile are the smallest
in the table.

9. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES LEVELS

A consistent finding throughout the analysis of the state court data is
that the level of compensatory damages for a particular case is a significant determinant of whether there is a punitive damages award and,
if so, the magnitude of the award. Virtually all of the successful plaintiffs
in this survey of civil trials were awarded compensatory awards. A com24. Rather than minimize the sum of squared residuals as in ordinary least squares
regression, quantile regression minimizes the sum of absolute residuals. The quantile equations correspond to different portions of the punitive damages distribution on the basis of
the error in predicting the awards levels. Thus, the estimates for the .90 quantile yield
coefficients so that 90 percent of the residuals are negative and 10 percent are positive. It
will generally be the large awards that will be at this upper quantile.
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Table 7. Regression Results for Log Compensatory Damages Awards

Explanatory Variablesa
Jury trial
Litigant pair:
Individual versus individual
Individual versus hospital, corporation, or
government
Individual and nonindividual versus hospital,
corporation, government, or individual
Case type:
Premises liability
Asbestos, breast implant, or other products liability
Intentional act
Medical or professional malpractice
Slander, libel, or defamation
Other negligent act
Fraud
Seller and buyer plaintiff
Employment discrimination or other employment
dispute
Mortgage foreclosure, rental/lease agreement,
intentional/tortious interference, or other
contract dispute
Eminent domain/condemnation, title or boundary
dispute, or other real property issue
Constant
Adjusted R2

Coefficient

Standard
Error

.980**

(.077)

-.960**

(.101)

-.
024

(.098)

.022

(.168)

.633*
1.573"*
.149
1.829"*
-. 344
.952"*
.663"*
.370**

(.102)
(.190)
(.159)
(.134)
(.400)
(.151)
(.149)
(.102)

.797**

(.160)

.450**

(.126)

.363
9.740**
.18

(.352)
(.120)

Note. The sample is composed of jury and bench trials in which plaintiff won (4,336
observations).
Also included in the regression equations are 10 indicator variables that represent the
counties listed in Table 3.
** The coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, two-sided tests.

plete assessment of differences between judges and juries in awarding
punitive damages must also take into account differences in their determination of compensatory damages awards for these cases. In this
section, we examine whether jury trials are more likely to lead to higher
compensatory damages awards by controlling for case characteristics.
Table 7 reports estimates of the logarithm of compensatory damages
against the control variables that have been included in the previous
analyses. Jury trials are associated with higher levels of compensatory
damages even after taking into account these other variables pertaining
to the parties involved, case type, and the county location. The only
litigant pair variable that has a significant effect on compensatory damages is individual plaintiff versus individual defendant cases, which has
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a negative influence relative to nonindividual plaintiffs. Case types that
did not have a powerful effect on punitive awards nevertheless have a
large influence on compensatory damages. Particularly noteworthy in
this regard are the large incremental damages amounts for medical or
professional malpractice, other negligent act, and asbestos, breast implant, or other products liability. While these and other determinants of
damages differ greatly in their influence on compensatory and punitive
damages, one consistent influence is the positive effect of jury trials on
both types of awards.

10. SENSITIVITY TESTS AND COMPARISON WITH THE EISENBERG ET AL.
RESULTS

The results presented here are based on the same state court data set
used in the Eisenberg et al. (2002) study, yet they yielded contradictory
findings. Eisenberg et al. find no jury effect on punitive damages awards;
we find a consistent and statistically significant influence. In this section,
we consider alternative specifications. Doing so provides information on
the robustness of our findings and identifies the sources of disagreement
with the Eisenberg et al. findings. Specifically, we compare the specification used in our probit results reported in column 2 of Table 5 with
the logistic results of Eisenberg et al. reported in their table 3. We note
that although the following discussion reports the consequences of
changing one assumption at a time, we estimated all of our models using
every possible combination of alternative assumptions. The results are
consistent with those reported below.
Table 8 summarizes the sensitivity tests and identifies the essential
causes of the disparity.25 As the following discussion demonstrates, Eisenberg et al.'s results are sensitive to the treatment of Harris County
trials in their analysis and to their inclusion of two highly correlated
jury variables. The other differences in specification, such as number of
litigant pair categories, number of case type categories, adjustment for
sampling weights, or adjustment of the standard errors for clustering,
are not responsible for the disparity.
Working through these possibilities one by one, it should first be noted
that Eisenberg et al. estimate logistic equations and present odds ratios;
we estimated probit equations. Preliminary analyses yielded the unsur25. For brevity, we do not present alternative specifications for our tobit results, but
these follow a pattern similar to the probit estimates.
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Table 8. Sensitivity of Jury Effects to Alternative Specifications of the Punitive
Damages Award Equation

Specification
Reference point probit results
Logistic odds ratio model
Detailed litigant pairs
Detailed case types
Clustering at county level
Sampling weights
Full set of county dummy variables
Influence of Harris County:
No county dummy variables
Harris County dummy variable only
Harris County excluded, no county dummy variables
Harris County excluded, county dummy variables included
Harris County excluded, county dummy variables and
weights included
Harris County only

Jury
Standard
Coefficient
Error
.256**
1.722"*
.274**
.214"
.256*
.180
.238*

(.100)
(.358)
(.100)
(.101)
(.126)
(.109)
(.107)

.135
.225*
.287*
.324**

(.096)
(.097)
(.103)
(.106)

.351"
.504

(.116)
(.430)

Note. All equations are identical to the reference point equation in Table 5, column 2,
except as indicated. The dependent variable is one if there was a punitive damages award
and zero otherwise. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The coefficient is statistically significant from zero at the 5% level, two-sided tests.
The coefficient is statistically significant from zero at the 1% level, two-sided tests.

prising conclusion that none of the differences arise from the use of
logistic rather than probit regression; the following discussion reports
probit coefficients as we successively consider the impact of replacing
Eisenberg et al.'s specification with that employed in our main analysis.
Now consider the controls for litigant pairs and for case types. Given
the relatively small number of punitive awards and the fact that, as
demonstrated in Table 4, certain types of litigant pairs and certain types
of cases are disproportionately likely to be heard by either a judge or a
jury, controlling for more rather than fewer litigant pairs or types of
cases may induce correlations that further mask the effect of type of
trial. For example, judges did not award punitive damages in any cases
of medical or professional malpractice or slander, libel, or defamation.
However, as we now discuss, substituting Eisenberg et al.'s categories
for ours does not change our finding of a statistically significant jury
effect.
Our analysis groups litigant pairs into four categories, in contrast to
the eight litigant pairs used by Eisenberg et al. The jury coefficient remains statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level when
substituting Eisenberg et al.'s litigant pairs for ours. As for case types,
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we group case types into 12 categories, in contrast to the 17 categories
used by Eisenberg et al. Using their narrower classification of case types
again does not alter the statistical significance of the jury variable or its
magnitude, which continues to imply a .01 higher probability of a punitive damages award if awarded by a jury.
Since multiple trials occurred in each of the 45 counties represented
in the sample, Eisenberg et al. adjusted the standard errors for the possibility that the error terms for observations within counties are correlated with each other. This adjustment for within-county clustering assumes that the error terms for observations between counties are
independent.26 The adjustment for clustering will not affect the coefficient, but it usually increases the standard errors, and in doing so, it
may lower the significance level of coefficients. Nonetheless, using our
basic specification, adjusting for clustering does not change the statistical
significance of our jury coefficient.
Because the sampling procedure captured a different share of trials
in different counties, the survey provides sampling weights. Estimation
using sampling weights results in the jury coefficient dropping to the 90
percent level of significance. The large sampling weight given to Harris
County leads to this result for reasons we now address.
As discussed earlier, our basic specification controls for 10 county
indicator variables. As Table 8 indicates, the statistical significance and
magnitude of the jury indicator are not affected by controlling for all
45 counties.27 However, exclusion of all county indicators reduces the
magnitude and significance of the jury effect. This reduction in the jury
effect can be traced to the failure to account for the influence of Harris
County.
Harris County, Texas, is an aberration among the counties in several
ways." First, Harris County had more trials than any other county and
is the county most affected by the sampling procedures. Only 352 of
the county's 1,500 trials were included in the sample, which is reflected
in Harris County having the largest sample weight. Second, the largest
26. If the error terms for observations within a given state are correlated, this assumption of independence between counties will not hold, and the adjustment for clustering
gives misleading standard errors.

27. No punitive damages were awarded in eight counties. As there is no variation in
awarding punitive damages, observations in these eight counties are dropped by the probit

model.
28. This information is reported in the data documentation of U.S. Department of
Justice (2001; 1999, pp. 23, 10).
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punitive award in the sample, $138 million, was a jury verdict for a trial
in Harris County.
Third, and most important, Harris County had by far the largest
number of trials in which a judge awarded punitive damages. Of the 54
bench trials in the sample in which punitive damages were awarded, 12
of these awards occurred in Harris County. Indeed, the Bureau of Justice
Statistics estimates that for the set of all trials in the 45 counties, bench
trials in Harris County awarded punitive damages in 67 trials, which
exceeds the projected total of 46 punitive awards in bench trials in all
of the other 44 counties combined. In contrast, juries in Harris County
were not markedly different than juries in other counties in their propensity to award punitive damages. Only four of the 119 jury punitive
awards were made in Harris County. As the regression results demonstrate, unless the equation includes a control for Harris County, the
significance of the jury effect is diluted by the large number of bench
punitive awards relative to jury punitive awards within a county that
contributes a large number of observations to the sample.
The final five jury coefficients reported in Table 8 identify how Harris
County influences the results. Simply including an indicator for Harris
County but for no other counties is sufficient to raise the jury coefficient
and significance back to levels comparable to the basic specification.
Indeed, excluding all Harris County observations results in even larger
estimates of the jury coefficient, whether or not county indicators are
included in the equation and whether or not sampling weights are used.
The reason for the difference in the magnitude is clear from the results
estimated for Harris County alone. These results demonstrate that juries
within this large county are less likely than judges to award punitive
damages, although this effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels, with a p-value of .135.
A final difference not reported in Table 8 is that Eisenberg et al.'s
specification controlled for both a jury indicator variable as well as the
interaction of jury trial with the log of compensatory damages. Inclusion
of these two terms in our specification indicates that both the jury coefficient and the coefficient on the interaction term are not significantly
different from zero.29 Inclusion of this interaction term allows the effect
of compensatory awards on the probability of making a punitive award
to differ between judges and juries. But since the inclusion of two such
29. The coefficient (and standard errors) on the jury indicator and the jury-log compensatory interaction are .686 (.459) and -. 041 (.042), respectively.
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highly correlated jury variables raises the risk that the significance of
the jurycoefficient will be affected by multicollinearity, it is important
to test whether the interaction term is appropriately included in the
equation. Indeed, although neither coefficient is individually statistically
significant, a test of the null hypothesis that jointly these jury coefficients
are not statistically significant results in a p-value of .02, which indicates
that in combination, juries have a statistically significant effect on the
probability of awarding punitive damages. Given this test, inclusion of
the interaction term serves only to induce multicollinearity with the jury
term.

11. CONCLUSION

Large punitive damages awards garner headlines and attract controversy.
To assess whether judges exercise more restraint than juries in making
punitive damages awards, we began with a comprehensive survey of all
punitive damages awards of at least $100 million. This world of blockbuster awards is almost exclusively the province of juries, which are
responsible for 95 percent of these awards. These blockbuster awards
are not correlated with compensatory damages awards.
Our analysis then considered data from the Civil Justice Survey of
State Courts, 1996. Examination of the level of punitive damages awards
for all cases shows that juries award higher levels of punitive damages
than do judges. Juries also have a higher probability of awarding punitive
damages. Moreover, juries are especially likely to make a large punitive
damages award conditional on a punitive damages award being made.
Thus, juries are more prone to generate large awards than are judges.
The ultimate economic impact of these punitive awards is affected
by settlements, reductions, and reversals. Nevertheless, the initial magnitude of the award is likely to exert an influence on litigation outcomes.
First, the existence of a large punitive award will affect the bargaining
power of the parties in the post-trial settlement process, theoretically
leading to higher settlement amounts. Second, defendants may also seek
to settle similar cases to avoid risking punitive damages. Third, even if
awards are reduced, it is possible that large punitive damages awards
have an anchoring effect in the appeals process, leading to a higher award
after the appeal. Fourth, the appeals process is costly, and higher stakes
make it desirable to spend more on the appeal. And finally, some awards
are not reduced or overturned. While our analysis does not provide an

PUNITIVE DAMAGES / 35

assessment of the economic ramifications of punitive damages, it does
show a difference in the behavior of judges and juries.
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